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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Croatian Constitutional Court (hereinafter CCC or Court) in its judgment of 12 Janu-
ary 20151 on ex post assessment of Family Act 20142 delivered the following ruling: 
“[…]
i) the execution of all the individual decisions and actions undertaken based on the Family 
Act 2014 is suspended until the adoption of a final judgment of the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Croatia on the compliance of the Family Act with the Constitution [enacting 
part I of the ruling];
ii) the Family Act 20033 shall be applied until the adoption of the final judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic Croatia [enacting part III of the ruling] […]”
Of course it is not unusual, that in a rule-of-law-state there is a clear division of responsi-
bilities between the legislature as the institution which makes the law and the judiciary which 
has to control the application of the law in the most effective way possible. This is why in 
democracies – with some exceptions,– some kind of judicial review (weak or strong)4 can be 
found in order to, inter alia, meet the demands of a separation of powers, either bundled in a 
unique competent constitutional court, or split between various specialized courts.5 In con-
nection with these review competences the courts usually have it within their power to declare 
a regulation null and void or inapplicable in some countries where a separate constitutional 
court is established with an effect erga omnes. In other countries, only with an effect inter par-
ties, namely for the parties of the examined case.6 Temporal effects of the court’s decision are 
classified as ex tunc, ex nunc and pro futuro.7 Courts have to expressis verbis state the temporal 
effect of their decision in the ruling.
Constitutional courts are not equally reluctant or activists in intervention into legislative 
power in Europe. That is why it is all the more astonishing that the Croatian Constitutional 
Court – in the present case – suspended the law in dispute even without a final decision in the 
judicial review proceedings and ordered the re-enactment of a more than 10-years-old regu-
lation. In practical terms, the Court, based on rather vague and non-existing legal provisions, 
in order to make the principle of legal certainty prevail, rendered the former Family Law Act 
(2003) applicable until a final judgement is delivered on the contested new Family Law Act 
(2014), while all actions based on the Family Act 2014 were suspended. These two actions 
taken together basically mean the suspension of the Family Act 2014 itself. The rather vague 
1  No. U-I-3101/2014. Translation is provided by Prof. Branka Rešetar who added that pages 6 to 333 of the ruling contain all 
observations and expert opinions as an integral part, but this part has been dismissed from the translation since their content 
has not been considered in the proceeding. 
2  Official Gazette no. 75/2014.
3  Official Gazette no. 116/2003, 17/2004, 136/2004, 107/2007, 57/2011, 61/2011, 61/2011, 25/2013.
4  See e. g, Colón-Ríos, ‘A new way of judicial review of legislation’, Global Constitutionalism (2014) vol. 3, issue 2, July 2014, 
Gardbaum, ‘The new commonwealth model of constitutionalism’, 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 707 (2001).
5  Schroeder, Die zeitliche Wirkung von Urteilen in Normenkontrollverfahren, p. 87.
6  For a detailed overview: Schmitz; Krasniqi, Die Beschränkung der zeitlichen Wirkung von Urteilen, p. 189, also Popelier, 
Verstraelen, Vanheule, Vanlerberghe, eds, The Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time. Intersentia, 2014.
7  For definitions see, Popelier, Verstraelen, Vanheule, Vanlerberghe, ‚The Effect of of Judicial Decisions in Time: Comparative 
Notes’, in Popelier, Verstraelen, Vanheule, Vanlerberghe, eds, The Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time, Intersentia, 2014, pp. 7–12.
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provision in this case is Article 31 (5) of the Constitutional Act on the Croatian Constitutional 
Court (2002, hereinafter CCCA), which stipulates: 
“(5) The Constitutional Court may determine the manner in which its decision, respective 
its ruling, shall be executed.”
Seeing this quite activist approach towards interpretation of the Croatian Constitution-
al Court on its own competence, the authors would like to take the Croatian Constitutional 
Court’s decision as an opportunity to examine the conditions for a re-enactment of formerly 
repealed law, and in addition the temporal effects of judgments of some European constitu-
tional courts from a comparative law perspective. The astonishing action of the Court was that 
without clear legal basis, it re-enacted a former law (2003) leaving the constitutionality of the 
law challenged an open question and suspended all actions that have been taken on the basis of 
the challenged law (2014). The example of Article 140 (6) of the Austrian Constitution shows 
that in some cases even a re-enactment of an earlier law, which was later replaced by the law in 
dispute, can be expressly intended and regulated in the constitution. However, in Austria it is 
applied when a law is declared unconstitutional and thus annulled. The German jurisprudence 
also acknowledges an equivalent legal instrument, not on a basis of a formal re-enactment, but 
rather through the continuity of former law, if the disputed law is declared null and void. 
With a deeper and more extended comparative analysis of this possibility of a court, we 
intend to show whether the action taken by the CCC alone and in conjunction with the sus-
pension of all action based on the challenged law, fits or does not fit into the general practice 
of constitutional courts in Europe. It can also be seen that the CCC based its decision on a 
provision which exact content, as being so vague and ambiguous, cannot be easily determined. 
This comparative analysis may or may not lead us to a conclusion that the Croatian Court did 
nothing special, but broadly interpreted its competences.
For this abovementioned comparative purpose, this article will first deal with particularly 
the (historical) legal situation in Austria and Germany and the criteria which generally would 
justify a re-enactment of former law in their legal systems, and afterwards put the develop-
ment of these countries’ legal systems into the context of the situation in Croatia. 
2.   THE AUSTRIAN REGULATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1920 AS 
‘THE EXAMPLE’ FOR OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS
The new Federal Republic of Austria which was formed after 1918 was – together with the 
former Czechoslovakia – the first country in the world, which gave the final word in the inter-
pretation of the law not to the legislator himself anymore, as it was the customary in those 
days, but to a single (Constitutional) Court.8 The main reason for an independent review of 
both the States’ (Länder) law and the Federal law was not to strengthen individual rights, but 
to safeguard the strict distribution of powers between the Federation on the one hand and the 
8  Hiesel, Verfassungsgesetzgeber und Verfassungsgerichtshof, p. 2 ff.
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States on the other hand.9 This is why in the original version of Article 140 (1) of the Austrian 
Federal Constitution (AFC) there was only the possibility of an abstract review of Federal law 
on the request of one of the States (Länder) respectively a review of Land law on the request 
of the Federation. However, the also existing possibility to review a law which would have to 
be applied by the Constitutional Court itself led to a more detailed regulation of also concrete 
reviews in 1929, which became an example for many European countries.10
2.1.  THE GENERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SUCCESSFUL REVIEW 
According to the current version of Article 140 AFC, the Constitutional Court makes a ju-
dicial review when the Federal Government requests the examination of a Land law or a Land 
government requests the examination of a Federal law, regardless of the question, whether the 
Federal law has any effect in the concerned Land. Furthermore, it initiates a review at the re-
quests of the Supreme Court and the Administrative Court, or ex officio, if the constitutionality 
of a law might be relevant to its own decisions. A corresponding provision for legal ordinances 
can be found in Article 139 AFC. Article 140 AFC itself stipulates as follows:
“(1) The Constitutional Court pronounces on application by the Administrative Court, 
the Supreme Court, a competent appellate court or an independent administrative tribunal 
whether a Federal or Land law is unconstitutional, but ex officio in so far as the Court would 
have to apply such a law in a pending suit. It pronounces also on application by the Federal 
Government whether Land laws are unconstitutional and likewise on application by a Land 
Government, by one third of the National Council’s members, or by one third of the Federal 
Council’s members whether Federal laws are unconstitutional. A Land constitutional law can 
provide that such a right of application as regards the unconstitutionality of Land laws lies 
with one third of the Diet’s members. The Court pronounces furthermore whether laws are 
unconstitutional when an application alleges direct infringement of personal rights through 
such unconstitutionality in so far as the law has become operative for the applicant without 
the delivery of a judicial decision or the issue of a ruling […]”
At a substantive level, the original version of the Austrian Constitution provided a rescis-
sion of the law in dispute upon expiry of the date of promulgation, which in the end means 
an inapplicability with the effect ex nunc. For reasons of certainty, the decisions do not, in 
general, provide any retroactivity for former legally binding matters, except the starter cases 
for the decisions.11 The citizens shall rather be able to trust that even an incorrect regulation 
would be effective until its official rescission by the court.12 Besides that, right from the start, 
the constitution even offered the possibility to delay the binding effect of the rescission in the 
beginning for a period up to six month, later up to 12 month, since 1992 up to 18 months. The 
idea behind the temporary delay pro futuro was in particular to avoid any kind of legal vacuum 
9  Stelzer, Pro Futuro and Retroactive Effects of Rescissory Judgments in Austria, p. 63.
10  Walter, Die mitteleuropäische Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und die Reine Rechtslehre, p. 266.
11  For the criteria determining the range of starter cases: Mayer; Kucsko-Stadlmayer; Stöger, Grundriss des österreichischen 
Bundesverfassungsrechts, p. 589.
12  Adamovich; Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht, p. 339.
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and to offer the legislator the chance and in particular the needed time to make a new regu-
lation which matches all criteria to be constitutional before the former law forfeits its legal 
force.13 Namely, Article 140 AFC stipulates in its paragraph 5: 
„(5) The judgment by the Constitutional Court which rescinds a law as unconstitution-
al imposes on the Federal Chancellor or the competent Governor the obligation to publish 
the rescission without delay. [...] The rescission enters into force on the day of publication if 
the Court does not set a deadline for the rescission. This deadline may not exceed eighteen 
months.”
The consequences are quite largely known. For reasons of legal certainty a regulation which 
in fact already had been considered unconstitutional would be applied anyway for a certain 
period. All actions based on that regulation would carry the stigma to be somehow illegal. 
2.2. THE POSSIBILITY OF REENACTMENT OF THE FORMER LAW
With the constitutional reform in 1929 the Austrian legislator introduced another inno-
vation: if a law or a part of it is repealed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court, those 
regulations would come back into force, which had been abolished by the law and found to be 
unconstitutional. There is no similar legal fate of legal ordinances and statutes according to 
Article 139 AFC. The current version of Article 140, paragraph 6 specifies:
“(6) If a law is rescinded as unconstitutional by a judgment of the Constitutional Court, 
the legal provisions rescinded by the law which the Court has pronounced unconstitutional 
become effective again unless the judgment pronounces otherwise, on the day of entry into 
force of the rescission. The publication on the rescission of the law shall also announce wheth-
er and which legal provisions again enter into force.”
Thus, according to the wording, the re-enactment of the former law should be the rule.14 
The reason for this stems directly from the negotiations in 1925 on the constitutional reform: 
the legislator explicitly wanted to prevent a vacatio legis in important areas of legislation re-
sulting from the repeal of a law. The re-enactement of a constitutional, former law should thus 
fill the gap, without having to take recourse to a further application of a law, which dogmati-
cally is attached with the stigma of unconstitutionality.15
Of course, the Constitutional Court has the possibility to dispense with the re-enactment 
of previous law expressly in its judgment. Anyway, in contrast to the wording in Article 140 
(6), the Constitutional Court, in practice, nearly always makes use of this possibility.16 The 
reason for this is simple: The referring back to former law is often not possible, as long as only 
smaller parts of a law have been rescinded and therefore caused a legislative gap. Detailed reg-
ulations from a former law might probably not fit to fill this gap in an appropriate way. They 
13  Adamovich, Handbuch des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts, p. 457.
14  For further details: Haller, Die Prüfung von Gesetzen, p. 265.
15  Haller, Die Prüfung von Gesetzen, p. 265.
16  Adamovich, Handbuch des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts, p. 458.
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would be taken from their original context and put into a new context, and it is not even said, 
that the original regulation itself matched the criteria of constitutionality.17 This is why the 
Constitutional Court would regularly have to examine the former law as well, even without a 
clear mandate. Furthermore, by reforming former law the legislator apparently made clear, 
that he considered the former law unsuited to the present situation. Besides, the former reg-
ulations often would not even meet the current European Union’s statutory and regulatory 
requirements. 
Against this background, the Constitutional Court cannot apply Article 140 (6) AFC with-
out further consideration, even though it was the legislator’s general will to refer back to the 
former law. As a result, the Austrian Constitutional Court would in almost all cases make use 
of the exception within Article 140 (6) AFC and announce in its decisions, that:
“Former legal provision will not come back into force again.”18
One of the few exceptions, in which the Austrian Constitutional Court in the end re-en-
acted the former legal provisions, was a case dealing with a new Security Act (2011) of one of 
Austria’s Länder, namely the Steiermark, which prohibited begging in any “important public 
place”.19 
The decision shows in an exemplary manner under which conditions the re-enactment 
of former law can make sense in order to follow the legislator’s expressed will and to avoid a 
legislative gap: The Constitutional Court criticized that the new provision was too vague and 
disproportionate and thus the Court considered it as nothing less than a serious infringement 
of the principle of legal certainty. In the same time the Court announced repeatedly, that the 
former law, which only prohibited “aggressive begging” in the Steiermark in general was much 
more balanced. This former law was from 2005, so it was not “too” old, and as the new law was 
rescinded in its entirety, the former law could easily replace it in its whole context. Therefore, 
the decision matched the main aims of a re-enactment: the provisions for a transitional period 
would not have the stigma of unconstitutionality and represent the legislator’s (recent) will 
anyway. The legislator on the other hand would have the time needed to work on a new, more 
balanced law.   
3.  THE GERMAN REGULATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
In contrast to Austria, and thus to most constitutional systems, Germany is one of the 
few European countries (besides Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), in which – in 
general – the declarations about the compatibility with the constitution would generally not 
17  Haller, Die Prüfung von Gesetzen, p. 267.
18  This standard ruling “Frühere gesetzliche Bestimmungen treten nicht wieder in Kraft“ can be found e.g. in all published decisions 
from 2014/2015:  https://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/entscheid.html?periode=old.
19  Decision G 64/11-8 from 6th December 2012. Online: https://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/attachments/9/0/8/CH0006/
CMS1361283710520/bettelverbot-steiermark-g64-8.11.pdf.
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only lead to an inapplicability ex nunc, but to a nullity ex tunc. The relevant basis for this legal 
consequence can be found in section 78 Constitutional Court Act which explicitly stipulates: 
“If the Federal Constitutional Court comes to the conclusion that Federal law is incompat-
ible with the Basic Law or that Land law is incompatible with the Basic Law or other Federal 
law, it shall declare the law to be null and void. If further provisions of the same law are incom-
patible with the Basic Law or other Federal law for the same reasons, the Federal Constitution-
al Court may also declare them to be null and void.”
There are various, especially historical reasons for the provision, namely that the framers 
of the Basic Law from 1949, were convinced that (only) the null and void-rule would force the 
legislator to make strong laws and not weak compromises for political needs. In particular, a 
governing coalition could not make a rather vague law for political reasons and sit back and 
leave it to the Constitutional Court to “fix” the law, because they would always risk to lose the 
legal basis definitely and thus to reverse all legal relations concerned. In addition, the strict 
nullity of an unconstitutional law was considered to emphasize the supremacy of the consti-
tution within the legal system in an appropriate way.20
Anyway, even though there has only been an explicit regulation about the possibility not 
to declare a law null and void, but not to declare it (only) “incompatible”, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, for practical reasons has made more and more declarations of incom-
patibility in the course of the last 40 years, so the further development of the law was caused 
by judicial decisions. Furthermore, after a reform in 1970, the possibility to declare a law only 
incompatible with the Constitution has at least been mentioned indirectly in section 31 (2) 
and in section 79 (1) of the Constitutional Court Act. In the meantime, the relation between 
decisions ex tunc and decisions ex nunc has developed in the ratio of almost 1:1.21
3.1.  DECISIONS EX TUNC AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REENACTMENT 
CONTINUITY OF FORMER LAW
A null and void (ex tunc) decision would be made, if the nullity of the concerned law can re-
store the constitutional situation unequivocally and without further ado, or the infringement 
of the Basic Law is irreparable or too serious to stay in force.22 “The example” for a serious 
violation of the constitution is, if the legislator did not even have the competence for the leg-
islation, as the matter would have to be regulated by the Länder.23 Anyway, even in a case of 
nullity, for reasons of legitimate expectations, legal clarity and legal certainty, the cases which 
have become legally binding, except in criminal matters, could not be opened again.24
20  Seer, Die Unvereinbarkeitserklärung des BVerfG, p. 290.
21  Schlaich; Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, recital 397.
22  BVerfGE 34, p. 9 (p. 25); BVerfGE 91, p. 148 (p. 175); BVerfGE 120, p. 56 (p. 79).
23  Seer, Die Unvereinbarkeitserklärung des BverfG, p. 285. Anyway, the Court’s decision in BVerfGE 91, p.186 ff shows, that even 
in cases in which the legislator would not have the competence for any legislation, the Court could declare a regulation for only 
incompatible if it comes to serious political or financial consequences, e.g. in tax matters.
24  Section 79 (2) Constitutional Court Act. For the deatiled criteria: Maunz; Schmidt-Bleibtreu; Klein; Bethge, Bundesverfassungs-
gerichtsgesetz, § 95, recital 37.
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Considering, that according to section 78 of the Constitutional Court Act an – unconstitu-
tional – law in dispute would ipso iure be null and void with an effect ex tunc, the current legal 
situation would in general automatically refer back to the former legal situation.25 It would 
not even need a formal re-enactment of former law, as a null and void regulation is considered 
not to have had the power to replace a former law at any time, e.g. according to the lex posteri-
or-principle.26 In short: the former law inconspicuously stayed in force the whole time as the 
new unconstitutional law never matched the criteria to replace it. Again, the idea behind that 
ambiguous regulated approach has also to do with the fact that Germany is a federation. If e.g. 
the federation made a law for which in fact the 16 Länder would have been competent, the law 
in dispute should not be a legal basis for any second, since it would give the Federal legislator 
the power to interfere with Länder law.27
Anyway, in the course of years, several criteria have been developed for cases in which the 
nullity of the concerned law would not lead to an automatic continuity of former law, e.g. if the 
former law itself also had partly been found unconstitutional.28 But the Court also practices 
judicial self-restraint when the legislator by making a new law somehow made obvious that he 
did not only want to modify the former legal situation but definitely change or even abolish it 
in its complexity, even if this new law might be found unconstitutional one day.29 The reasons 
for this are numerous, in particular the Constitutional Court practices a strict judicial self-re-
straint in the frame of the separation of powers, respecting that even an unconstitutional law 
would still have a democratic legitimacy and thus matches the prerequisites of democratic 
governance.30 
3.2.  DECISIONS WITH AN EFFECT EX NUNC OR PRO FUTURO
As in all other states that have an ex tunc-system, there is the possibility also in Germany to 
deviate from the principle of retroactive annulment, even though it is not explicitly stipulated 
in the law.31 Instead of declaring the concerned law null and void, the Constitutional Court 
would confine itself to declare it “incompatible” with the constitution. This ruling, that a per 
se unconstitutional regulation stays applicable anyway is considered appropriate, if the disad-
vantages caused by a rescission clearly outweigh the disadvantages connected to the further 
application of the law.32 In general, the law concerned would then be declared applicable for a 
25  Maunz; Schmidt-Bleibtreu; Klein; Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, § 48, recital 50 ff, BverfGE 102, p. 197 (p. 208); 
104, p 126 (p. 149f); 131, p. 316 (p. 376).
26  See Benda; Klein, Verfassungsprozessrecht, recital 1376; BVerfGE 104, p. 126 (p.149f).
27  Schlaich, Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, recital 457.
28  BVerfGE 131, p. 316 (p. 376), see also BVerfGE 121, p. 266 (p. 314).
29  Maunz; Schmidt-Bleibtreu; Klein; Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, § 78, recital 51; Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozess-
recht, recital 1488; Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozessrecht, § 20 VI, recital 127.
30  Burkiczak; Dollinger; Schorkopf, Heidelberger Kommentar, § 78, recital 44.
31  For a detailed overview: Schmitz; Krasniqi, Die Beschränkung der zeitlichen Wirkung von Urteilen, p. 200 f.
32  Burkiczak; Dollinger; Schorkopf, Heidelberger Kommentar, § 78, recital 49.
37
Tímea Drinóczi, Philipp Schneider, THE LEGITIMATION OF A RE-ENACTMENT OFF FORMER LAW AND TEMPORAL EFFECTS ...
further transitional period on the basis of section 35 of the Constitutional Court Act, which 
stipulates: 
“In its decision the Federal Constitutional Court may state by whom it is to be executed; in 
individual instances it may also specify the method of execution.”
The idea behind is to give the legislator enough time to organize a smooth transition from 
the unconstitutional to the constitutional situation, namely to avoid disruptions during the 
time being, especially in an area such as the tax law, where the state has a certain interest 
that the proceedings are not interrupted.33 This is why the most important, often criticized 
decisions with an effect ex nunc or even pro futuro would be related to cases dealing with the 
legislation of taxes and levies, in which the Court obviously intended to prevent an extensive 
retroactive tax relief for the tax payers with a certain danger of financial chaos or even the loss 
of a relevant part of the recent budgets.34 At any rate, one of the starter cases for the Court’s 
“incompatibility”-decisions in 1966 dealt with a Tax Act and the possibility that in declaring it 
null and void the Federal state might lose up to 41 percent of its annual tax income.35 
Apart from those evident serious cases, the Court would also decide on an incompatibil-
ity-basis in cases of minor legislative mistakes, which could be easily healed, e.g. caused by a 
wrong legislative procedure, or in cases where the legislator has several possibilities to solve 
the unconstitutional situation and therefore should not be limited in his possible actions. This 
might be the case if the judges cannot clearly define which part of the law would violate the 
constitution, e.g. if certain groups of people / organizations should be added or rather exclud-
ed from the field of application to match the criteria of equality, or, if the legislator has several 
possibilities to react: new definitions, a new field of application, or a completely new law. The 
Court would also rule “incompatible” in those cases in which the rescission of the law would – 
from a constitutional point of view – cause an even worse legal situation.36 By upholding the 
regulation, the Court would show respect to the legislator’s original will and give him a second 
chance to correct his own law. The Constitutional Court’s tendency to decide on the incom-
patibility-principle with a temporarily continued application in an increasing number of cases 
shows that the Court finally voluntarily waives his rights to strictly annul or even ‘regulate’ 
for a certain time being37, but instead practices a reluctant judicial self-restraint. Therefore, 
it gives the responsibility to deal with the unconstitutional situation back to the legislator as 
the responsible institution for both, the unconstitutional regulation in the past as well as the 
new – constitutional – regulation to be made.
4.   THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION IN THE 
LIGHT OF THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT
33  Schroeder, Temporal Effects of Decisions, p. 31. 
34  Seer, Die Unvereinbarkeitserklärung des BVerfG, p. 288.
35  BVerfGE 21, p. 12 (p. 39f); Burkiczak; Dollinger; Schorkopf, Heidelberger Kommentar, § 78, recital 35.
36  Maunz; Schmidt-Bleibtreu; Klein; Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, § 78, recital 68.
37  The Court can even give the interim situation a new substantive content up to a certain level, at least if the Court tries to “save” 
the law from definitely violating the constitution, e.g. in BVerfGE 87, p. 153 (p. 154).
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The legal systems of both Austria with its Constitution, which became “the Example” for 
most of the European countries and thus also for the recent development in Eastern and 
Southern Europe, and Germany show that a re-enactment, either in the explicit construc-
tion as in the Austrian Constitution, or as the German alternative of a strict consequence of 
a nullity ex tunc as well as with an effect pro futuro can be an appropriate measure in a case 
of an unconstitutional legal situation. In both cases the legislator at once gets back into the 
responsible position, in the same time the executive or judicial power does not have to apply 
a regulation which is attached with the stigma of unconstitutionality. Quite the contrary, for 
the transitional period a law would be applied which directly refers back to the Parliament, the 
sovereign law-maker, even if it was made a certain time ago. The Court thus does not have to 
interfere into the Parliament’s rights, let alone to provide the transitional provisions replacing 
the gaps in the legal text or the field of application caused by the incompatibility-decision. 
However, the jurisprudence of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts also show, 
that the label of constitutionality is not the most important factor in a rule-of-law state, let 
alone in a democracy: even an unconstitutional law is directly based on the Parliament’s will 
and therefore enjoys a high legitimation, not to mention legal certainty considerations which 
may legitimately arise if there is no law at all regulating a certain social or other field. In the 
constitutional interplay between an as best as possible legal certainty on the one hand and a 
strict separation of powers on the other hand, the legal systems must deal with well restricted 
criteria for a re-enactment of former law.
4.1.   THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S INVENTION OF PREVENTIVE 
INTERVENTION
The Croatian Constitutional Court obviously followed the path of a strict supremacy of 
the constitution and tried in the same time “to rescue” the legislator from a homemade con-
stitutional problem. The Court thus applied with good but inconsequential proposals its com-
petences laid down in the Articles 31 (5) and 45 of the Croatian Constitutional Court Act and 
Article 126 of the Croatian Constitution. 
First, as the Court was still dealing with the review, it temporarily suspended the execution 
of any action on the concerned legal basis, as it is explicitly provided in Article 45 CCCA:
“The Constitutional Court may, until the final decision, temporarily suspend the execu-
tion of the individual decisions or actions undertaken on the grounds of the law or the other 
regulation, the constitutionality respective of the legality of which is being reviewed, if their 
execution might cause grave and irreparable consequences.”
But then, instead of waiting for its own final decision or at least giving instructions for a 
further application of the Family Act (2014) for the needed time being, it declared in the same 
time the re-enactment of the former Family Act (2003) on the grounds of Art 31 (5) CCCA, 
which permits the Court to determine the execution of its “decisions and rulings” in general. 
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In its preventive intervention the Court even refers to Article 126 (1) of the Croatian Consti-
tution which stipulates the repeal of a law, which was (finally) found unconstitutional.38 
The decision, which is not less than an invention of preventive intervention of the Court, 
seems to mix two distinct legal institutions, namely the suspension of legal actions based 
on the law under examination and the annulment of the law itself. De facto, the suspension 
of any actions and the re-enactment of the former law meant a suspension of the Family Act 
(2014). The suspension or annulment is usually used for the direct protection of constitution-
ality, whereas the suspension of decisions and actions taken on the grounds of the challenged 
law takes legitimate expectations and legal certainty into account and protect the individual’s 
rights and interests during the review process of the constitutional or ordinary court, until the 
constitutionality is decided on. 
In its decision the CCC basically applied, due to the presumably long period of time needed 
for properly considering the case and pro and contra arguments, etc., a ‘presumption of un-
constitutionality and dysfunctionality’, because it did not intend to accept any possible legal 
and factual consequences that might be stemming from the future declaration of unconstitu-
tionality (which the Court may conclude after having examined all aspects of the problem). 
For this, however, there is expressis verbis no legal basis neither in the Croatian Constitution, 
nor in the Constitutional Court Act. Neither can the Court refer to the German possibility of 
continuity of former law which cannot be replaced by an ex tunc unconstitutional law, nor to a 
traditional similar jurisprudence which could at least justify the decision in the frame of legal 
certainty.
Instead, the Court made references to the rule of law and legal certainty principle without 
explicitly mentioning back to its own case law39 or at least referring to the case in hand to flash 
the legal relevance of these principles. Instead, the Court argued that its preventive interven-
tion in the form of factually re-enacting former law was necessary and required by the nature 
of the Family Act 2014 as being a systematic law with a general social character by which in-
dividuals are affected, which is ambiguous, vague, contains mutual contradictions. In the Court’s 
opinion, these may lead to an uneven application of law, due to some other flaws of the law, 
such as that institutional mechanism have not been available for the efficient implementation 
of the law in both administrative as well as judicial practice.40 Again, without reference, the 
Court established that‚ practical experience and previous judicial practice, which has demon-
strated that decision, regardless of their properness and necessity, do not achieve their full 
effect and required efficiency if they are not made in due time’.41 The Court also noted that 
overviewing the case, ‚disclosed, already at this point in the procedure, the reasonable doubt 
that the FA/14 contains structural flaws accompanied with individual solutions or sets thereof 
38  Art 126 (1) in its wording: “The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia shall repeal a law (act) if it finds it to be 
unconstitutional.” 
39  Application of former case law reinforces legal certainty. This latter requires that proper reference is made to the sources 
based on which the Court founds its decision, even in a case when former decisions of a constitutional court is withdrawn. See 
decision 13/2013. (VI. 17.) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, ABH 2013. 440. 453–453. [31]–[34], according to which in 
constitutional democracy, the reasoning of a decision and its sources have to be open and controllable for all; the principle of 
legal certainty requires that factors influencing the decision have to be transparent and traceable. The Hungarian Constitutional 
Court refers to its former decisions by clearly indicating them and quoting its parts. 
40  Ruling [760–761, 764].
41  Ruling [767.1].
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which might – if this preliminary assessment turns out to be correct – qualify this act as dys-
functional to the extent that shall entail incompliance with the Constitution’.42
4.2.  ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE CCC 
The examples of the Austrian and German legal systems, in which the explicit or at least 
indirectly regulated possibility of a re-enactment has only been used for few cases show, that 
there are good reasons for a judicial self-restraint, leaving the responsibility for the treatment 
of an unconstitutional law to the legislator alone. This must be even more true, if the legal 
system, such as in Croatia, does not explicitly provide the re-enactment.
The CCC might have had a good intention to prevent grave and irreparable legal actions on 
the grounds of a possible unconstitutional law. But with its ruling unilaterally attaching pri-
ority to a constitutional legal basis it did not match the criteria of the well-balanced interplay 
between the legal certainty on the one hand and the strict separation of power on the other 
hand, neither in the formal, nor in the substantive provisions.
Strictly speaking, even for the suspended actions the ruling does not even provide any 
specific information, in how far a mere number of possible violations of the constitution could 
lead to “grave and irreparable” damages and thus justify the suspension. The Court rather re-
fers to the quantity of cases than to the quality of the possible damage. 
Furthermore, for the re-enactment of former law, the decision lacks of any specification in 
how far Article 31 (5) CCCA could be an appropriate legal basis. In its very wide interpretation 
of Art 31 (5) CCCA the Court does not determine with any single word in how far – for histor-
ical, systematic or teleological reasons – the regulation might also express the legislator’s will 
to cover any rulings according to Article 45 CCCA, especially if it comes to a re-enactment of 
law, a rather legislative competence. First, Article 45 CCCA is only meant to regulate the treat-
ment of legal actions for a certain transitional time, namely until the Court’s final decision. 
Through the combination with a re-enactment it would de facto create a final legal situation 
without even waiting for a final decision or ruling in the main proceedings. The Court even 
ignores the consequences, what happens if the final decision confirms the constitutionality of 
the concerned law in the end: there would be two separate Family Acts under circumstances 
and the legislator would have to deal with a dual legislative situation that was not even caused 
by him. 
Finally, even if the re-enactment of former law could be somehow based on Art 31 (5) 
CCCA in general, then at least it would not have been an appropriate measure in this concrete 
case. The Austrian and the German jurisprudence show clearly, that a re-enactment of former 
law depends on many different factors and conditions. This must be even legitimate if the 
legal system does not explicitly know the legal institution of re-enactment in general: The 
Court would have been obliged, to show at least in an exemplary way the seriousness of the 
situation, by giving concrete examples and the possible grave consequences stemming from 
the lacks in the law. It should have explained why a standard measure like the suspension / 
42  Ruling [765].
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inapplicability ex nunc or even pro futuro should not have been a practicable way, and if the 
damage stemming from the application of a “possibly unconstitutional law” which still enjoys 
the legislator’s legitimation is really substantial enough to justify a serious interference in the 
Parliament’s competences. What makes the situation even worse is the fact that the Croatian 
legislator obviously did not only want to modify the Family Act, but instead change it com-
pletely. This is even proven by the fact that the government elaborated a new draft bill only 13 
days after the ruling and made a new law within only few months. In the end the ruling caused 
exactly the contrary of what countries with a decision ex nunc or pro futuro generally intent and 
what makes their jurisprudence well-balanced: to give the legislator the time to deal with his 
own mistakes and find balanced new provisions. The Croatian Constitutional Court rather put 
the legislator under pressure of time.
5.  CONCLUSION 
The Croatian Constitutional Court obviously needed more time for the request of profes-
sional opinions and also for a closer examination of the complex issue. While the suspension 
of any legal actions according to Art 45 CCCA was a legitimate and appropriate measure, the 
re-enactment of the former Family Act (2003) is lacking a convincing legal justification. The 
Court’s ruling cannot be based on Art 31 (5) CCCA, at least not without further ado. By ruling 
a re-enactment of the former Family Act (2003) anyway the Court did not even achieve to 
match the criteria established by other jurisprudences, e.g. in Austria and Germany, for good 
reasons. In particular, the Court ignored the legislator’s obvious will not to refer back to the 
former law. Thus, the interference in the legislative body in a well-balanced system of checks 
and balances carries even more weight. The success of the ruling will stay questionable, as the 
constitutionality of the Family Act (2014) is still to be decided. Whatever the final result is, 
the solution of the CCC is not convincing and it may forecast a very non-clear, uncertain and 
unpredictable operation of the CCC in the future, which consequential effect is exactly the 
opposite what the CCC has intended when delivered the ruling. 
In the end, the decision caused exactly the contrary of what usually is intended by a review 
ex nunc or pro futuro: to give the legislator the needed time to make a new, better law. And the 
ruling raises some open questions, in particular what happens, if the Court would never take a 
final decision in this matter, or – even “worse” – what happens if the Act turns out to be con-
stitutional. The Court never considered, what the consequences would be, if the former Family 
Act (2003) itself could intermediately be attached with the stigma of unconstitutionality, e.g. 
due to changes in the EU law, different interpretation of legal institutions due to legal equality 
etc. Then the questionable interference in the legislator’s competences would have caused an 
even worse damage as if the Court simply had left the law in dispute in force.
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LEGITIMNOST VRAĆANJA NA SNAGU  
PRIJAŠNJEG ZAKONA I VREMENSKO DJELOVANJE ODLUKA U 
SUSTAVIMA USTAVNE DEMOKRACIJE
Sažetak
Godine 2015. Ustavni sud RH suspendirao je Obiteljski zakon (2014) i naložio primjenu pret-
hodnog Obiteljskog zakona (2003), starog više od deset godina, a da nije proveo postupak 
i donio odluku o neustavnosti suspendiranog Zakona. Potaknuti ovom odlukom hrvatskog 
Ustavnog suda, u radu se komparativno ispituju uvjeti za vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propi-
sa stavljenog izvan snage, kao i vremensko djelovanje odluka odabranih europskih ustavnih 
sudova. Stoga ovaj rad pruža priliku čitatelju da se upozna s praksom austrijskog i njemačkog 
ustavnog suda, kao i uvjetima na temelju kojih je moguće vratiti na snagu prijašnji propis u 
njihove pravne sustave, ukazujući na pravnopovijesne razloge postojanja ovakvog rješenja. Za-
ključno se u radu austrijski i njemački sustav razmatraju u aktualnom hrvatskom kontekstu.
Ključne riječi:   ocjena ustavnosti zakona, Ustavni sud, vraćanje na snagu prijašnjeg propisa, 
suspenzija Obiteljskog zakona (2014), Obiteljski zakon (2003) 
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